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I. Introduction: When Science Appears at the Bar
In 1995, Sheila Jasanoff, one of the leading researchers of studies of Science, Tech-
nology and Society (STS), published one of her most important works: “SCIENCE AT
THE BAR.” In this book, she highlights the ways in which US courts inﬂuence the devel-
opment of science, society and law, taking as examples tort cases of product liability and
medical malpractice, judicial review of scientiﬁc regulations, cessation of medical treatment
and use of assisted reproduction technology. While indicating problems courts face in
handling scientiﬁc issues, Jasanoff also lauds them as indispensable in bridging the gap
between law and science.
At the time Jasanoffʼs book was published, expert testimony was frequently heard in
product liability and medical malpractice lawsuits and in criminal trials in the United
States. Experts who testiﬁed were often criticized as partisan, taking sides with one of the
parties, and thereby ﬁlling the courts with “junk science” and distorting scientiﬁc truth. In
1993, in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc, 509U.S.579, the United States Supreme
Court replaced the Frye test of “general acceptance in the particular ﬁeld”1), which had
been the standard for the admissibility of scientiﬁc evidence since 1923, and empowered
courts to play the role of “gatekeepers” and verify the relevance and reliability of scientiﬁc
evidence and testimony before it is proffered to a jury.
In this case, a judge was requested to serve as a gatekeeper in assessing the “scientiﬁc
validity” of evidence. Since the judgment made reference to theories of the philosophy of
science, such as Popperʼs principle of falsiﬁability, as an indicator of “scientiﬁc,” it
aroused debates from various quarters regarding the relationship between law and science.
Japanese courts had not yet clearly recognized by the 1990s that they would need to
directly address issues related to modern science and technology. The situation has
changed dramatically over the more than 20 years since. In 1995, in the wake of a mercy
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1) Frye v. United States, Court of Appeals of District of Columbia, 1923. 54App.D.C.46, 293 Fed. 1013.
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killing at a hospital, Yokohama District Court issued a standard for justiﬁable euthanasia.2)
In 2007, the Supreme Court handed down a ruling under which a surrogate mother would
be treated as the legal mother of the child, as courts had ruled in the past.3) Courts have
been asked to formulate norms on issues of morality brought before them and they have
done so in many cases. The increased number of medical malpractice lawsuits and the
proliferation of nuclear power-related lawsuits in the wake of the nuclear accidents caused
by the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011 have imposed increasing pressure on courts to
address issues involving science and technology. In addition, the development of DNA
analysis seems likely to encourage the use of scientiﬁc evidence and enhance its
importance. Thus, “science at the bar” is now recognized as one of Japanʼs great contem-
porary challenges.
Japan can be said to lag 20 years behind the US in recognizing the importance of
“science at the bar.” However, Japanese courts had already been successfully addressing
the problems pointed out by Jasanoff, such as environmental pollution and adverse pharma-
ceutical side effects, as early as the 1960s. In comparison to the United States, in which
the number of mass tort actions began increasing in the 1980s and the use of scientiﬁc
evidence became a problem, it can be said that science was brought to court earlier in
Japan.
Why, then, did this fail to lead to a recognition in Japan that science was a core issue
in court cases ? Section II below reviews the background in Japan, while Section III ana-
lyzes how scientiﬁc issues have been addressed at the bar. Section IV forecasts the poten-
tial of courts to function as forums for the discussion of these issues in this age of science
and technology.
II. Why was “Science at the Bar” not a focus in Japan ?
1. Development of “contemporary litigation” and science
In the United States, seeing that disputes over science and technology were being
brought to court more frequently, Kantrowitz advocated the concept of a “science court” in
1967 (Kantrowitz,1967). This is also the same year in which the Niigata Minamata disease
lawsuit was ﬁled and litigation on the four big pollution diseases started in Japan. As
cases of pollution and drug-induced damages were ﬁled as tort actions, scientiﬁc knowl-
edge was needed to prove causation and negligence. For example, the “Itai-Itai” disease
case is said to be the ﬁrst lawsuit in Japan in which a scientist gave testimony in order to
prove the causation of the disease (Matsunami,1998). The history of science lawsuits pro-
2) Tokai University Hospital Euthanasia Case, judgment of the Yokohama District Court, July 23, 1995,
Hanrei Jiho No. 1530, p. 28.
3) Surrogate Mother Case, decision of the Second Petty Bench of the Supreme Court, March 23, 2007,
Minshu Vol. 61, No. 2, p. 619.
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gressed along with the development of these cases.
However, the argument that these kinds of cases should be categorized as “science
lawsuits” and that the trial should be held based on scientiﬁc evidence did not advance
greatly in Japan. The establishment of a “pollution court” was proposed which would have
resembled a science court (Kikkawa, 1978), but it only focused on the advantages of
efﬁcient and uniform administration of justice by means of a court with exclusive
jurisdiction over pollution cases, and did not aim to enhance the scientiﬁc expertise of
courts.
One reason may be the way of understanding of epidemiology, which prevailed in the
pollution lawsuits. In these lawsuits, the courts adopted an epidemiological causation
theory, which required that a causal relationship be found between the pollution and the
disease based on epidemiological research in order to provide relief to victims. Because of
this, epidemiology came to be regarded not as a standard of proof based on scientiﬁc
knowledge but rather as a legal doctrine intended to help victims by lowering the standard
of burden of proof imposed on plaintiffs. At that time, pathological knowledge was recog-
nized as capable of providing scientiﬁc proof. Defendants claimed that plaintiffs should
prove the pathological causation between the pollution and diseases. However, it was
thought that pathological analysis could work against helping victims. In the world of
jurisprudence, it is still commonly held that the ﬁnding of a causal relationship based on
epidemiology is a legal value judgment. Based on this understanding, Harada (1979)
argues that in pollution lawsuits, the court, “refrained from involving itself in making sci-
entiﬁc judgments,” and that the fact that, “these lawsuits were not science lawsuits in the
true sense, because the court did not directly make judgments on scientiﬁc issues,” was the
key to the success of the pollution lawsuits.4)
In addition, despite a fundamental belief in the existence of scientiﬁc truth, legal dis-
putes involving scientiﬁc facts were viewed from a political perspective— as battles
between scientists on the side of state power and scientists on the side of citizens. Thus,
the scientiﬁc disputes raised in pollution lawsuits were not viewed as purely scientiﬁc
issues. This likely engendered an atmosphere contrary to the development of a legal
means of evaluating the scientiﬁc knowledge disputed in pollution lawsuits from a sci-
entiﬁc perspective.
On the other hand, pollution lawsuits and drug lawsuits in Japan were characterized as
one type of “contemporary litigation (gendai-gata sosho),” which opened the door to a new
understanding of litigation proceedings. Fresh light was shed on the capacity of litigation
4) Harada (1979) further argues that when dealing with claims for injunctions to prevent the risk of
damage and addressing scientiﬁc issues raised in administrative lawsuits, the court should follow the
procedure to examine ex post facto the safety examination process followed by the experts. This argu-
ment is still widely accepted. Tsuda (2004) harshly condemns the courtsʼ reluctance to emphasize epi-
demiology and their lack of understanding of statistics underlying epidemiology.
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to provide a forum, meaning that the ﬁling of a lawsuit and the subsequent court proceed-
ings provide parties with an opportunity to engage in an orderly debate on an equal foot-
ing, while raising questions in the wider society and stirring social debate. Lawsuits in this
category have also given rise to arguments that the nature of litigation is to provide parties
with a place to debate, and that this guarantee of due process is the substance of civil
litigation5). However, because these lawsuits were not regarded as science lawsuits, they
did not at the time result in trials based on expert scientiﬁc knowledge of the scientiﬁc
issues.
2. Judicial passivity and science
The Japanese judiciary has generally been described as more passive than the other
branches of state power. This passivity results from the institutional frame that the legisla-
tive and executive branches are empowered to create norms, while the judiciary is
empowered to review created norms ex post facto. Even premised on this fundamental
mechanism, Japanese courts have been criticized for their passivity and conservativeness.
It can even be said that courts have sought to avoid making judgments on political issues
to the greatest possible extent.6)
Question may be raised as to the source and division of the institutional power to
establish rules and regulations concerning science and technology. Fundamentally, the
conventional view was that the legislative and executive branches should take the initiative
in carrying out this task in light of both the institutional framework of the government and
their resource advantages, including expertise. The judicial branch was only required to
defer to the judgment of the other two branches.
Nuclear power-related lawsuits are a typical example. In the leading Supreme Court
case concerning the Ikata Nuclear Power Plant in 1992,7) the court ruled that when examin-
ing the safety of the basic design of a reactor facility, it should, “focus on whether any part
of the assessment conducted by the defendant administrative agency on the basis of the
expert technical investigation, deliberation and determination of the Atomic Energy
Commission or the Reactor Safety Examination Committee was unreasonable.” If it was
then found, in light of then-current scientiﬁc and technological standards, that “errors or
omissions that cannot be overlooked” were made during the assessment or deliberations
and that “the defendant administrative agency is deemed to have relied on these factors” in
making its determination, the administrative disposition granting permission to install the
reactors should be considered illegal. If not, the expert technical assessment made by the
5) Generally referred to as the argument for the third wave of the guarantee of due process; see Inoue
(1988).
6) For the creation and changes in this court culture, see Watanabe (2015a).
7) Judgment of the First Petty Bench of the Supreme Court, October 29, 1992, Minshu Vol. 46, No. 7, p.
1174.
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administrative agency should be respected.
Nuclear power issues involve an aspect of discipline in the development and use of
science and technology. At the same time, it is a political issue affecting national energy
policy. The high level of technical expertise required to handle nuclear power-related
issues could discourage courts from rendering consequential judgments. The traditional
politically passive posture of Japanese courts inclines them to respect the administrative
agencyʼs assessments. Accordingly, Japanese courts refrain from delving deeply into and
making consequential rulings on scientiﬁc issues. As a result, they lack the courage to
analyze cases from the “science at the bar” angle.
However, the recent Justice System Reform was aimed at shifting from a society
protected by ex-ante regulations to a society focused on ex post facto relief, and demand
that the judiciary act as an adequate check on the executive and the legislature. Partly
because of this, the Supreme Court has in recent years shown a somewhat more positive
attitude toward judicial review of the constitutionality of laws and regulations and to
rendering judgments declaring laws and regulations unconstitutional. It has also more fre-
quently found plaintiffs to have standing to sue in administrative litigation.
Until the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in 2011, the nuclear
power issue had been viewed as a partisan political battle between the pro-nuclear power
(pro-establishment) group and the anti-nuclear power group. Nuclear plant safety had not
been seriously considered as a subject of scientiﬁc study. In the wake of the accident,
however, judicial decisions made in previous nuclear power-related lawsuits have been
under renewed scrutiny. In the future, nuclear power-related lawsuits may be the main
ﬁeld of science and technology-related litigation, and will take center stage as “science at
the bar” in Japan. The accumulating deliberations and decisions of Japanese courts in this
ﬁeld will be key to future public conﬁdence in the courts as important forums for the
discussion of science and technology.
III. Framing “Law and Science” at the Bar in Japan
1. Medical malpractice lawsuits: where law and science collide
In Japan, medical malpractice lawsuits are considered to be typical examples of sci-
ence lawsuits. This view originates in a Supreme Court judgment handed down in 1976 in
a case of medical malpractice involving a medical procedure called lumbar puncture at the
University of Tokyo Hospital. In this case, the Supreme Court held as follows.
The proof of causation required in litigation is not proof in the meaning used in the
natural sciences, which allows no shadow of a doubt, but is rather proof of a high
level of probability that the relationship wherein a speciﬁc event invited a speciﬁc
consequence can be conﬁrmed through a comprehensive examination of all evidence.
A determination that causation has been fully proven requires only that an ordinarily
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person would not doubt that the purported causal relationship exists8).
In the end, the causal relationship found by the Court was not consistent with any of
the court-appointed experts’ opinions submitted to the court.9)
This holding has been widely accepted as good ruling among legal practitioners and
scholars, and even today is referred to as a judicial precedent in every study on “law and
science” or “science lawsuits” (e.g., Kamemoto, 2014; Kasai, 2014).
The dilemma in relation to expert scientiﬁc opinions is that judges seek expert opin-
ions because they lack expert knowledge, but they need expertise to evaluate and select
appropriate expert opinions to a certain extent on which to base their judgements. This is
an inherent problem recognized in science lawsuits (Nakano, 1988) not only in Japan but
in any other countries generally.
In the United States, the main question is what procedure to follow in science law-
suits, whereas in Japan, attention is directed primarily to the decisions made by judges.
This difference may partly reﬂect the institutional characteristics of the Japanese justice
system. As it does not have juries, the judicial culture in Japan places a great deal of
emphasis on careful fact ﬁnding and the ability of professional judges to ﬁnd the truth,
which is coincident with general expectations of Japanese people to their courts.
However, treating medical malpractice lawsuits as typical examples of science law-
suits and applying the rules and requirements of these lawsuits to science lawsuits more
generally has proven problematic. Although medicine is categorized as a ﬁeld of the natu-
ral sciences, the decisions made by clinicians actually engaged in medical practice are
called into question in medical malpractice lawsuits. Clinicians make their decisions based
on their sense of value and are expected, because of their role, to assume responsibility for
their decisions to a certain extent. However, in the world of natural science, it is not
generally anticipated that scientists will be directly responsible for the impact of their
researches and activities on society. Science was considered and is still likely to be con-
sidered purely a pursuit of scientiﬁc truth.10) Thus, medical decisions and scientiﬁc knowl-
edge are considerably different in nature.11)
8) Second Petty Bench of the Supreme Court, October29,1976, Minshu vol29-9 1417.
9) Since the Supreme Court drew a conclusion that was not necessarily consistent with any of the submit-
ted expert opinions, its judgment is often criticized as ridiculous in medical circles.
10) For this reason, a study of science, technology and society which attempts to recognize the presence in
society of other ﬁelds of science and technology that have had less contact with society and explores an
appropriate way of interaction between science, technology and society, has at last started to develop.
On the other hand, medical sociology has already been established as an independent ﬁeld of study to a
certain extent. The study of science, technology and society and of medical sociology have some areas
in common.
11) However, in reality, medical judgment and scientiﬁc knowledge are easily confused. In particular,
concerns are often expressed about the possibility that scientists go beyond the bounds of science and
make policy decisions. For example, Kageura (2012) criticizes the comments given by experts following
the Great East Japan Earthquake, and presents provisional deﬁnitions of “experts” and “scientists” ; →
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However, it is still worthwhile to study medical malpractice lawsuits as models for
science lawsuits for the following reasons.
First, the specialized nature of the scientiﬁc issues disputed in science lawsuits pose
the same inescapable difﬁculties courts encounter in attempting to address the issues raised
in medical malpractice lawsuits. Therefore, approaches to the handling of medical mal-
practice lawsuits may hint at how to handle science lawsuits in general, although the expert
knowledge required differs depending on the type of lawsuit.12)
Second, medical malpractice lawsuits are undeniably actually assumed to be typical
examples of science lawsuits. In particular, through the analysis of judicial precedents,
including the Lumbar Puncture Malpractice Case, causation-in-fact in medical malpractice
lawsuits, which was formerly treated as causation under the medical deﬁnition, is now
deﬁned in legal and normative terms. This appears intended to justify court judgments in
medical malpractice lawsuits by emphasizing their legal nature, and may also be applicable
to science lawsuits generally.
2. Future paradigm for specialized lawsuits
During the Justice System Reform carried out at the beginning of this century, medi-
cal malpractice was recognized as a specialized type of lawsuit and studied in detail. The
term “specialized lawsuits” is an abbreviated version of “lawsuits requiring specialized
knowledge,” and was fully discussed for the ﬁrst time by the Justice System Reform
Council. Delays caused by the difﬁculty of obtaining expert cooperation in medical mal-
practice lawsuit proceedings were criticized as a serious problem. In addition to medical
malpractice cases, other types of cases such as labor cases, building construction cases, and
intellectual property cases were categorized as specialized lawsuits and measures were
implemented relating to each types of case.
These measures can be roughly divided into two types. One is the introduction of
new examination methods and special procedures for each type of case, thereby enhancing
the expertise of courts. The creation of the Intellectual Property High Court and the labor
tribunal system were measures of this type. In 2001, medical malpractice divisions were
established at the Tokyo District Court and the Osaka District Court.
The second type of measure was enhancing the system used to obtain expert coopera-
tion. In 2003, the Code of Civil Procedure was amended to improve the procedure for
→ experts are those who know and scientists are those who do not know, and people who, upon encounter-
ing a new event, do not regard it as an “unexpected” event but incorporate it in the scope of scientiﬁc
knowledge are called scientists.
12) It is necessary to pay attention to the scope of science lawsuits to which the approach employed in
medical lawsuits can be applied, while always giving consideration to the characteristics of the relevant
specialized ﬁeld and the substance of the issue that is disputed in the lawsuit. Therefore, when experts
are involved in litigation proceedings, it is also necessary to provide them with the knowledge on the
context of the lawsuit.
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obtaining opinions from court-appointed experts and to introduce technical advisors. With
regard to medical malpractice lawsuits, the Medical Malpractice Lawsuit Committee was
established in 2001 within the Supreme Court and a list of court-appointed experts was
prepared.
Thus, initiatives have been taken to enhance the expertise of courts by establishing
various procedures and divisions that reﬂect the unique features of specialized ﬁelds, and
these initiatives have generally been favorably evaluated.
The labor tribunal system created to deal with individual labor disputes has been par-
ticularly successful.13) The Intellectual Property High Court was established to meet the
need for specialized and expedited proceedings in intellectual property cases. Although
some aspects of this new court are worthy of scrutiny, such as the decreasing number of
intellectual property cases brought before it and the frequent reversal of its judgments by
the Supreme Court,14) it has generally received a positive assessment.
In the ﬁrst place, since the establishment of specialized divisions and the assignment
of certain types of cases to such divisions were transitionally implemented according to the
type of case, these measures were accepted with almost no resistance (Watanabe, 2012).
Within a specialized division, a judge handles only the speciﬁc type of case for which the
division was created for as long as they are assigned to it. However, as judges are
transferred to other divisions at relatively short intervals, they are still expected to be gen-
eralists.
Procedural improvements in the specialized ﬁelds and specialization of divisions and
judges within courts have become irreversible trends. The question now is how to position
science lawsuits generally within these trends instead of resisting to the trends. Having
said that, as the term “science” covers a broad range of topics, it would be unreasonable to
empower a speciﬁc court or division with exclusive jurisdiction over lawsuits involving all
“science,” except for medical malpractice litigation. Furthermore, even where judges pos-
sess some scientiﬁc background or knowledge, it is never enough, making expert knowl-
edge from outside the court crucial.
13) While the labor tribunal system is often understood as an alternative dispute resolution system, it may
be more appropriate to understand it as a new type of procedure specialized in the ﬁeld of labor dis-
putes that is included in the court system, because the case is supposed to be transferred from the
tribunal to the court and professional judges who take part in the tribunal proceedings are expected to
ﬁnd a legal solution to the dispute. For the survey on users of the labor tribunal system, see Sato
(2011).
14) Miyawaki (2015) points out that the Intellectual Property High Court adopts a highly predictable norm,
while the Supreme Court adopts a norm based on comprehensive consideration, and such difference in
the norms adopted resembles the difference seen between the CAFC and the Supreme Court of the
United States; however, the converse phenomenon is also seen in Japan.
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3. Appropriate involvement of experts in litigation
In Japan, the procedure of seeking opinions from court-appointed experts has been the
primary way in which experts have become involved in litigation proceedings. A court
appoints an authority in the relevant ﬁeld as a fair and neutral expert, and the appointed
expert independently prepares a written opinion and submits it to the court. Most court-
appointed experts complete their duties by expressing their opinions in writing, but some
are summoned to court to give oral testimony. The procedure for seeking written opinions
from independent experts is based on the assumption that experts in a particular ﬁeld
should be capable of providing answers to any questions concerning the relevant ﬁeld.
Before the 2003 amendment to the Code of Civil Procedure, court-appointed experts had
been treated in the same manner as ordinary witnesses and subjected to cross-examination
by both parties. Probably due to the distress caused by this obligation, it had been difﬁcult
to ﬁnd people who would be willing to serve as court-appointed experts.
To solve this problem, a new procedure has been introduced in which a court-
appointed expert is ﬁrst questioned by the judge and then by the parties. In addition,
technical advisors15) are now appointed from whom judges can hear an explanation when
necessary.
However, courts rarely have appointed experts in pollution lawsuits, drug lawsuits or
nuclear power-related lawsuits. In these types of cases, experts are usually retained by the
parties to give testimony. Where a dispute involves “science in action,” it is not always
possible to ﬁnd an expert who can serve as a neutral and fair third party. The appointment
of experts by courts is not very common even in medical malpractice lawsuits, in which
expert opinions submitted by parties have been used relatively frequently. Experts are
more often retained by the parties to submit opinions; parties are even recommended to
solicit expert opinions in this way. The Japanese procedural rules stipulate that experts
participate in proceedings as court-appointed experts and technical advisors. In reality,
experts are more often retained by the parties and this tendency has intensiﬁed even after
the Justice System Reform.
Experts rarely appear in court to state their opinions orally. They are far more likely
to only submit written opinions to courts. Civil procedure is mainly conducted through the
examination of documentary evidence in which medical articles submitted by the parties
are admitted as important evidence.
On the other hand, no special Japanese procedural rules exist regarding the treatment
of expert witnesses other than those appointed by a court or the treatment of written opin-
ions and documents submitted by experts. The law leaves these matters to practice.
Thus, while in the United States, cross-examination of expert witnesses based on their
conﬂicts of interest interferes with the objective of obtaining appropriate scientiﬁc knowl-
15) Articles 92-2 to 92-7 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
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edge at the bar, it is not a direct problem in Japan. In fact, nothing restricts this under
Japanese law.16)
Experts retained by the parties and the written opinions they submit may be referred
to as “private experts (shi-kantei-nin)” and “private expert opinions (shi-kantei),”
respectively. They are treated as almost equivalent to court-appointed experts or their
opinions. Under Anglo-American law, these opinions fall within the category of opinion
evidence and are basically inadmissible at the bar. On the other hand, under Japanese
practice, these expert opinions are treated in almost the same manner as documentary evi-
dence.17)
As illustrated above, it is only dimly found that the cross-examination of experts dis-
torts the elucidation of scientiﬁc or medical truth. Furthermore, the accurate evaluation
and use by judges of opinions and documents submitted by expert witnesses in the making
of legal determinations is not thought to be problematic in Japan.
4. Difference between legal judgments and scientiﬁc judgement
The prevailing view regarding the evaluation of scientiﬁc expert opinions is that, “a
court has to make a legal and normative judgment, instead of making a purely scientiﬁc
judgment.” Therefore, it is sufﬁcient for judges to, “use knowledge sufﬁcient to enable
them to understand an expert opinion and exercise common sense in comparing it with
other documents or compare two expert opinions that present different conclusions, thereby
ﬁnding a rule that is appropriate for the case” (Noda, 1988, p. 21). This view is basically
positively accepted.18)
The biggest reason supporting this view is that evaluation of scientiﬁc expert opinions
is not intended to be an evaluation of science itself, but rather a normative evaluation that
will serve as the basis for a legal judgment. The normative nature of this evaluation is
partly derived from the belief that judges make normative evaluations based on sound
16) Hondo (2010), a physical scientist who stood in court as an expert witness appointed by the party,
vividly describes that the cross-examination procedure is not suited for an expert to speak “scientiﬁc
truth.” The parties and judges force the expert to answer yes or no to their questions, ignoring that a
scientiﬁc fact is valid only under certain conditions. If the expert tries to maintain a sincere attitude as a
scientist, the expert has no choice but to refuse to answer, or give a conditional answer by clearly
limiting the conditions under which the scientiﬁc fact in question is valid. Furthermore, the expert has to
take the witness stand in the position of representing the community of science, while speaking to only
laypersons in science such as attorneys at law and judges. This procedural structure often makes the
expert step out of his/her own ﬁeld and speak judgments containing his/her own personal sense of values
and political or moral aspects as a scientiﬁc fact.
17) It is considered that admission of these expert opinions as evidence requires consent from the other
party; however, in practice, they are generally treated as strong evidence (Kondo and Ishikawa, 2015;
49).
18) Nakamura, Takahashi, and Fukuda (2014; 229), Hori (2013), etc. For example, Nishioka (2008), after
making reference to Nodaʼs statement, argues that “in order to ﬁnd legal responsibility, it is not always
necessary to elucidate the concrete and detailed mechanism.”
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common sense rather than on expertise of a speciﬁc ﬁeld.
The argument that the evaluation of causation-in-fact is a legal and normative judg-
ment undeniably serves in some ways as an excuse for the fact that judges, who are medi-
cal laypersons, cannot be expected to make medical judgments. Given that a judge must
determine causation on legal grounds, it simply follows that a judgment made by a judge is
of a normative nature.
Another argument attempts to justify judgesʼ judgments by emphasizing the belief that
their nature as generalists causes them to comprehensively evaluate all evidence based on
common sense. Japanese courts tend to place a great deal of emphasis on a judgment
based on social consensus and common sense. This argument assumes the great stature of
judges to be based on these tendencies.
In accordance with the principle of enabling free determination by judges, Japanese
courts admit a wide range of evidence submitted by the parties. In addition, the high level
of interest by the public in achieving justice results in a tendency by Japanese courts to
urge parties to offer proof to ﬁnd the truth, and even causes them to exercise their power
to control proceedings paternalistically. This tendency is often justiﬁed by the notion that
the public wants courts to do so.19)
In evaluating medical expert opinions, the Supreme Courtʼs holding in the Lumbar
Puncture Malpractice Case is often understood to lower the required level of proof below
the scientiﬁc proof, “which allows no shadow of a doubt.” However, this is inconsistent
with the actual self-awareness of judges and public expectations for courts. Japanese
courts are strongly inclined to ﬁnd out the substantial truth, and they are supposed to,
“consider scientiﬁc issues in line with the relevant science to the greatest possible extent”
(Kasai, 2014, p. 150). In short, it is thought that courts should introduce appropriate sci-
entiﬁc knowledge and that judges can and should evaluate it accurately.
However, in reality, neither medical nor scientiﬁc knowledge is independent and static
outside of a court. Furthermore, the assumption that judges, who are scientiﬁc laypersons,
are capable of evaluating scientiﬁc knowledge accurately is a fantasy. In science lawsuits,
it is impossible to completely separate scientiﬁc or medical issues from other issues. New
scientiﬁc knowledge centered on the legal issues is created at the bar. What Jasanoff
pointed out in her book is the potential to create scientiﬁc knowledge. The key is how to
create it, and the procedure for creation is necessarily an essential factor.
With regard to expert cooperation, courts should serve as forums for generating shared
understandings of the conditions and extent to which it is appropriate for experts to provide
their opinions at the bar. This cannot be done without relying on the tacit knowledge of
experts. In order to reveal the tacit knowledge of experts and question it if necessary,20) it
19) Tsuchiya (2015; 14) and Chiba (2003), while pointing out this tendency, argue that it is important to
encourage the parties to recognize their responsibility for offering proof through the adversary system.
20) At the same time, this may lead to questioning implicit knowledge that legal experts rely on. →
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may be insufﬁcient for judges to rely only on documentary information, such as medical
papers. In addition, the process of enabling litigation proceedings to function as forums
for the discussion of science and technology-related issues, it may be important to create a
place at the bar where experts can more actively communicate with other experts or non-
experts.
IV. Conclusion: Courts as Forums of Scientiﬁc Issues
As discussed above, courts in Japan have played a leading role from relatively early
on in dealing with issues arising from the use of science and technology to give relief to
victims, mainly in the ﬁeld of tort law. However, concerning scientiﬁc and technological
disciplines, courts have generally deferred to the determinations of the executive and legis-
lative branches. Furthermore, a perception existed that relying on scientiﬁc knowledge
might not be conducive to giving relief to victims. For these reasons, no argument directly
questioning “science at the bar” has been generated.
On the other hand, studies have been undertaken in recent years to determine how
courts should evaluate scientiﬁc evidence and the nature of expert participation in litiga-
tion, mainly in relation to medical malpractice lawsuits. As in the case of the United
States, these studies involve the issue of the partisan nature of expert witnesses retained by
the parties. However, in Japan, this issue was not given much emphasis. More attention
was focused on how judges should introduce expert knowledge to reach appropriate judg-
ments. The prevailing view is still that judges can reach appropriate judgments by exercis-
ing common sense and evaluating expert information submitted in writing.
However, as Jasanoff pointed out, courts are at present inevitably facing various issues
relating to science and technology. Courts now serve as indispensable forums for setting
out the course of disputes relating to science and technology and ﬁnding resolutions to
them.21) It is necessary to earnestly explore optimal proceedings to achieve this.
To this end, it may be desirable to actively call experts to courts to reveal their tacit
knowledge so that judges and parties can create a shared understanding while ascertaining
a valid view in the relevant specialized ﬁeld.
One possible model worth noting is the approach whereby more than one expert con-
currently participates in the proceedings and join with the judges and the parties in creating
→ Teshima argues: “if there is something that should be called “implicit knowledge” in fact ﬁnding, it may
ultimately refer to the fact that legal practitioners have knowledge on the characteristics of civil litiga-
tion, knowledge on the difﬁculties and weak points in fact ﬁnding, and full knowledge on how to over-
come them (by choosing appropriate procedures and using their accumulated experiences)” (Teshima,
2014; 126).
21) As represented by lawsuits claiming non-smokersʼ rights and anti-nuclear power lawsuits, litigation has
already been used as a means of carrying out social movements, and it has already been pointed out that
these lawsuits can function as a forum for discussing these issues.
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a shared understanding on the point at issue in the case. The medical malpractice division
of the Tokyo District Court uses a procedure like expert conference (“conference kantei”)
in which three court-appointed experts state their opinions orally.22) This procedure has the
advantage of enabling experts to participate relatively easily and enabling judges to gain a
better understanding of what they need to know by directly questioning experts. However,
as it is a heavy burden for the court to appoint three experts, this system is used only in
very limited cases in Tokyo. Another possible approach is the “concurrent evidence” pro-
cedure employed in Australia using expert witnesses. In this procedure, before trial,
experts retained by parties prepare a Joint Report incorporating a summary of the matters
upon they agree and disagree at the joint conference. At trial, the expert witnesses are
sworn together and sit together at the witness box and they give testimony concurrently to
create an understanding with the judges and the parties. Furthermore, a hybrid of these
two procedures has been proposed wherein one expert appointed by the court and two
expert witnesses retained by the parties would be concurrently examined (“conference of
evidence”; see Hirano, 2016). This is also worth noting as a type of procedure involving
more than one expert stating opinions orally at the bar.
In these interrogatory procedures, more than one expert participates concurrently in a
proceeding to provide opinions, in a cooperative rather than a confrontational manner, to
conﬁrm points with which they agree and with which they do not. The use of these proce-
dures will enable the introduction of as much scientiﬁc expert knowledge as possible into
proceedings involving the relevant specialized ﬁelds and will promote active communica-
tions at the bar in specialized cases.
As the main purpose of this paper is to review the meaning and nature of “science at
the bar” to date, it cannot fully discuss these new procedures.23) However, as pointed out at
the beginning of the paper, “science at the bar” is becoming a major factor in lawsuits
concerning various issues, such as the morality of life, nuclear power, medical malpractice,
environmental pollution, and adverse pharmaceutical side effects. Japanese courts should
therefore recognize that creating norms concerning scientiﬁc and technological issues is
now an important role for the judiciary and strive to develop litigation proceedings that can
function as forums for scientiﬁc issues.
22) Concurrent evidence has already been explained by a Japanese practitioner and the similarity between
this system and the expert conference system implemented at the medical malpractice division of the
Tokyo District Court has been pointed out (Masuo, 2007). Due to this similarity, concurrent evidence is
discussed with a nuance expressing that there is nothing that needs to be learned from the new type of
procedure introduced in Australia. In addition, among legal practitioners and jurists who engage in joint
studies, a mainstream opinion is that within the framework of the major theme of science and law, the
initiative of introducing concurrent evidence is nothing more than a trivial procedural reform. However,
the author of this paper considers that more emphasis should be placed on the signiﬁcance and possibility
of such initiative.
23) For this point, see Watanabe (2015b).
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